Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 32
Number 2 Spring

Article 7

January 2004

The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State
Immunity and the Specter of Victor's Justice
Scott Grosscup

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Scott Grosscup, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State Immunity and the Specter
of Victor's Justice, 32 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 355 (2004).

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

THE TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
THE DEMISE OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
AND THE SPECTER OF VICTOR'S JUSTICE
Scott Grosscup
The conflict in Yugoslavia during the last decade has culminated in
unprecedented events in international law due to circumstances particular to the
region. The war exposed a number of the intense ethnic tensions between Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serb populations' that had lain dormant in the Balkan region for
many years under the rule of General Josip Broz Tito. 2 The fall of the Soviet
Empire in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and the rise of right to selfdetermination principles in the region during the same period,3 brought instability
and war to Europe, the likes of which had not been seen since the end of World
War I1. The resulting ethnic hatred and political instability led an international
force to bring peace to the region 4 and has seen the first instance where the leader
of an independent state is on trial for crimes that occurred while he was in power.'
The events that began in Yugoslavia in the early 1990's are not over.
However, the majority of the violence that accompanied the rise and fall of
Slobodan Milosevic has subsided.6 The conflict involved numerous states and
international organizations. 7 After ten years, United Nations troops are still
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
1. See generally JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, RETURN TO DIVERSITY, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE WORLD WAR 11260-262 (Oxford University Press 1993).
2. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 209 (Pnnceton University Press
2000) (estimating that Josp Broz Tito and his communist partisans executed between 20,000 and 40,000
of the opposition Ustasha fascists in Tito's rise to power, mostly through summary executions, for fear
that criminal trials would enrage ethnic tensions).
3. See generally ROTHSCHILD, supra note 1.
4. See Roger Cohen, Crisis in the Balkans, NY TIMES, June 15, 1999, at Al (quoting a United
Nations mediator,0 Carl Bildt, "An international military presence to guarantee peace in the Balkans
must be seen in the coming decades").
5. Sheema Khan, Comment, Welcome Ex-Dictators, Torturers and Tyrants: Comparative
Approaches to Handling Ex-Dictators and Past Human Rights Abuses, 37 GONZ. L. REV 167 194
(2002) (comparing state actions against ex-dictators involved in human rights violations and the role of
the International Criminal Court in bnnging ex-dictators to justice).
6. See generally U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Serbia and Montenegro, available
at http:l/www.state.gov/r/paei/bgn/5388.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
7 In addition to the United Nations and NATO forces, the Red Cross, Amnesty International and
numerous other organizations have provided assistance and aid to the redeveloping nations. See Bosnia
Help Organizations, available at http://www.cco.caltech.edu/-bosnialhelp/org.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2004) (listing of some of these agencies).
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deployed in the region,8 serving to keep the peace, and numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are on the ground, administering aide,
overseeing relocation programs, and ensuring safe transitions to democracy 9
The conflict in Yugoslavia has also forged new ground on how the
international community deals with a nation's internal conflicts.I ° This includes
international intervention by a regional peacekeeping force" I and, in particular, the
first trial of a sitting head of state for state sanctioned criminal activities, and
violations of the evolving area of human rights law 12
This paper will examine the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, former President of
Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Part I discusses the events that led
to the arrest and charges against Milosevic. Part II explores why traditional
notions of sovereign immunity have not applied to his trial. Part III examines the
reasons why the international community has made an effort to prosecute the
former president. Lastly, Part IV looks at the impacts the trial will have on the
former Yugoslavian states,i 3 and potential ramifications if the prosecution fails to
convict the former president.
PART I -

TURMOIL IN THE BALKANS: THE RISE AND FALL OF MILOSEVIC

Prior to the eruption of war in 1991, Yugoslavia was the "Darling of the
West."' 14 Dunng this period, Yugoslavia received most-favored-nation status,
technology transfers, and cultural exchanges. 15 However, the Balkan states 16 have
complex ethmic and religious characteristics that have fueled conflict between the

8. See generally UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh/unmibh-body.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2002); see
also

UNITED

NATIONS

INTERiM

ADMINISTRATION

MISSION

IN

Kosovo,

available

at

http://www.unmikonline.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).
9. A search of the Regional Environmental Center found 127 environmentally focused nongovernmental organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 150 in Croatia and 160 in Yugoslavia.
Available at http://www.rec.org/REC/Databases/NGODirectory/NGOFind.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2002).
10. There is some debate as to whether the conflict in the former Yugoslavia constitutes an
international or an internal conflict. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), for purposes of jurisdiction, has decided that the war in Yugoslavia was of international
character.
II. See generally NATO Fact Sheet, NATO's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm.
12. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism Promise or Peril? 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153 (1999) (exploring the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo).
13. The former Yugoslavia was composed of six republics, Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, Serbia (with the once autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo), Montenegro, and
Macedonia.
14. JOHN FEFFER, SHOCK WAVES EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS 254 (South End
Press 1992).
15. Id.
16. The Balkans states are located between the Adriatic Sea to the west and the Black Sea on the
East, with Turkey and Greece to the South, and Slovakia and Ukraine to the North. SATELLITE WORLD
ATLAS 78-79 (Helicon Publishing 2001) (1999).
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Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian populations. 17 The assassination of Austrian
Archduke Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb nationalist in 1914 was the spark that sent
the modem world into what was at that point the worst war in history "8 After
World War I, the Balkan states formed the state of Yugoslavia in 1929 '9 This
union of ethnic Serb, Croat, and Slovene populations was tenuous, and in 1934 a
member of the Croatian independence movement assassinated King Alexander of
Yugoslavia.2 Yugoslavia once again saw an invasion, but this time by the Axis
powers of Germany and Italy in World War 11.21 During the War, Croatian
collaborators worked to rid Croatia of Serbs, mimicking the Nazi concentration
camps and exterminating over 500,000 Serbs and displacing another million.22
Communist partisan forces, led by Josip Broz Tito and assisted by the Allied
powers, helped rid the territories of Axis occupation.23 From 1945 until Tito's
death in 1980, ethnic tensions and nationalistic movements were suppressed by the
state through relocating Serb minorities in the various republics outside of Serbia.24
and the collapse of the Soviet
Professor Michael Scharf notes, "Tito's death
threat in the late 1980's unleashed the long-festering centrifugal forces that would
soon lead to Yugoslavia's disintegration. 25
The next section explores the recent history of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and events leading to the arrest and indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic as potential precedent necessary for the international community to
respond to conflict and serving as the base line for international law and the demise
of heads of state immunity
I History ofthe conflict
Slobodan Milosevic was born in Pozarevac, Serbia in 1941 to a communist
activist mother and absent father.26 Milosevic excelled at the University Law
School in the 1960's.27 After earning his law degree, Milosevic held several
Communist Party positions in city government and was appointed president of the
largest state-run bank in 1978.28 In 1986, Milosevic was appointed Communist

17. See MICHAEL P SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL

14 (The

Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc. 2002) (citing commentators who date the beginnings of
the turmoil in the Balkans to 1389 when the Ottoman Turks defeated Serbian forces in the battle of
Kosovo Polje, starting several hundred years of occupation by the Ottoman Empire).
18. See id. at 15. The assassination occurred on the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje
which occurred 525 years earlier.
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 17
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 5 (noting that both parents eventually committed suicide).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 8.
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Party leader after his friend and close ally, Ivan Stambolic, became President of
Serbia. 29 That same year the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences published a
memorandum that became the manifesto of the Serb nationalist movement and led
to Milosevic's rise to power.30 While Communist Party leader, Milosevic was sent
to Kosovo to quiet a Serb uprising against the Albanian majority "' Milosevic
spoke to a crowd of Kosovar Serbs and said:
No one has the right to beat our people!
This is your land, these are your
homes, these are your fields, your gardens, and your memories
Would you
shame your ancestors and disappoint your children?
We will win this battle.
Yugoslavia
does not exist without Kosovo
Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give
32
it away.
Milosevic used these nationalistic emotions, suppressed by the Tito regime for
years, to become President of Serbia in 1989 just as anti-Serb nationalism rose in
the republics of Croatia and Slovenia.33
In June 1991, at the order of President Milosevic, the Yugoslav National
Army invaded Slovenia and Croatia under the guise of "protecting" Serbs living in
those republics from anti-Serb sentiments.34 In a brutal military campaign, the
Serbs quickly gained control over nearly one-third of the Republic of Croatia.35
United Nations investigators later found mass graves in numerous places including
outside the city of Vukovar, where Serb forces massacred over 200 Croatian
hospital patients.36
Citing the rising tide of war in the region, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 713 in September 1991, which imposed an embargo
on the sale of arms to areas within the territory of Yugoslavia and called for the
parties to abide by the ceasefire agreement they had signed just a few days earlier
in Igalo. 37 By February 1992, satisfied that the conditions had been met for the
deployment of peace-keeping operation to the region, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 743, establishing the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR). 38 Subsequently, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted
for independence from Yugoslavia on March 1, 1992, 39 which was recognized by
the European Community on April 6, 1992.40 Shortly after the dissolution of

29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 9-10.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1I. The leaders of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and Slovenia, Milan Kucan, sought to
dilute Serbian influence in Yugoslavia by creating a loose federation of states, leading to the dissolution
of Yugoslavia in 1991. Id. at 19.
34. Id. at 19-20.
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id.
37 S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRes/713 (1991).
38. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. SfRes/743 (1992).
39 SCHARF, supra note 18, at 22.
40. STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION

OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION
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Yugoslavia, Serb forces attacked Croatian and Bosnian Muslim populations in the
republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to unite Bosnian Serb populations with
greater Serbia. 41 Although the official Yugoslav National Army (JNA) eventually
pulled out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia continued to arm and direct Bosnian
Serbs in the self-declared "Republika Srpska, a Serb-dommated area of BiH, 42
over the next few years committing violations of international humanitarian law,43
numerous mass killings, 44 and attacks on United Nations designated "safe areas. 45
The United Nations's inability to provide security for these areas led civilians to
call their "guests" by the derogatory name, "UNprotection Force, from the
acronym UNPROFOR, or United Nations Protection Force.46 One of the worst
massacres of the war occurred in eastern Bosnia in the town of Srebrenica after
forces and then
Bosman-Serb troops overran United Nations peacekeeping 47
executed thousands of unarmed men and boys alongside trenches.
In 1995, after air strikes carried out by the United States with NATO support,
Slobodan Milosevic traveled to the United States and signed the Dayton Peace
Accord dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into two "enities:" the Bosman-Serb
"Republika Srpska" and the Muslim-Croat Federation. 48 The accord also allowed
for greater deployment of United Nations Peacekeeping forces known as IFOR.
After several years of war, and up to 250,000 Muslim deaths and the displacement

'9

COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD 33

(Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000).
41. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 22. Bosnian Serb forces led by Radovan Karadzic seized control of
nearly seventy-percent of Bosnia leaving several enclaves under Bosnian control-Sarajevo, Mostar,
Bihac, Tusla, Srebrenia, and Gorazde.
42. NORMAN CIGAR & PAUL WILLIAMS, INDICTMENT AT THE HAGUE: THE MILOOviC REGIME
AND CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR 25 (New York University Press 2002); TERRET, supra note 41, at
33.
43. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 789 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at Part IV U.N. Doc S/1994/674 (1994), available at:
http://webmedia2.depaul.edu/ihrli/publications/yugoslavia.asp. See also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A (1999). Dusko Tadic was the first war criminal to be
tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Tadic was convicted of
individual criminal responsibility of willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health; crimes against humanity and violations of customs of
war all in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Tadic was present at the Omarska, Keraterm, and
Tmopolje camps in the Republic of Bosnia where he participated in "horrendous treatment" upon nonSerb populations including the forced transfer of civilians to camps, beatings, and killings of those
civilians. Tadic was sentenced to twenty years in a German prison for violations of international
humanitarian law.
44. Id. at 61.
45. See SCHARF, supra note 18, at 26-27 United Nations forces were deployed to protect and
demilitarize the six "safe areas" with a force of 7,500.
46. See, e.g., Emma Daly, Croats Dismiss Fears Of New War Independent (London), Jan. 23,
1995, at 8.
47 YvEs BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS 149 (St. Matin's Press, Inc., 1999) (describing
the July II, 1995 Serb attack on the U.N. safe haven of Srebremca, in which over 40,000 people,
mostly Bosnian Muslims, fled the area and anywhere from 4,000 to 10,000 men and boys were
systematically killed).
48. TERRET, supra note 41, at 96.
49. SCHARF, supranote 18, at 30-31.
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of over 2 million from Serb-controlled areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 50 it
appeared that violence in the region had reached its maximum and peace was on
the horizon. 51
Ideas of self-determination permeated the region, however, and, in 1996, the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacking Serbian positions. 52 Serbian
forces then turned their energies away from Bosnia and Herzegovina and began
clearing ethnic Albanians from the territory of Kosovo through forced relocation
and killings of civilians.53 The ensuing exodus of the ethnic Kosovo Albanians
brought about another NATO bombing campaign,54 the withdrawal of Serb forces
from the region, and a new government in Serbia.55
The NATO led bombing campaign, economic crisis, international pressure,
and years of unrest evaporated Milosevic's grasp on power. In September 2000,
Vojislav Kostunica defeated Milosevic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's
presidential elections.56 Milosevic did not recognize the results of the election
even though the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and the Serbian Parliament
recognized Kostunica as the legitimate president.5 7 Milosevic finally submitted his
resignation on October 6, 2000, after Serb soldiers along with thousands of
protesters stormed government buildings ending his tenure as president. 58 As a
result of the change in leadership, the United States lifted the oil embargo and
flight ban that had been imposed on the region since 1998. 59 At the same time,
leaders with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced plans to readmit
Yugoslavia,60 which had lost membership in the international financial institution
in 1992.61 IMF membership enabled access to significant financial support for the
tattered country's redevelopment.

50. Id. at 35.
51. Raymond Bonner, Bosnian Civilians Hopesfor Peace Are Modest, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 20,
1995, at A10.
52. 52.SCHARF, supra note 18, at 33.
53. Serb forces conducted killings of civilians as well as ethnic cleansing through rapes of
Albanian women with the intent of impregnating them with Serbian children. See generally Todd A
Salzman, Rape Camps as a means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural and Ethical Responses to
Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 363 (1998) (estimating anywhere from
20,000 to 70,000 survivors of rape from Serbian forces).
54. Id. at 34. NATO, using primarily the United States Air Force, bombed Serb forces from
March 24, 1999 through June 9, 1999.
55. Steven Erlanger, Showdown in Yugoslavia, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 7,2000, at Al.
56. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 36.
57. Erlanger, supra note 52.
58. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 36.
59. Lawrence L. Knutson, U.S. Lifts Yugoslavia Sanctions, AP ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 27905642 (citing commentators who have noted that these sanctions were not in place
dunng the war that dissolved the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1991 through
1995, discussed above, which experienced far greater casualties than the events in Kosovo).
60. Id.

61. Id.
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2. Creation of the ICTY
The United Nations Security Council, pursuant to Article 39 of the United
Nations Charter,62 established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) on May 25, 1993.63 Resolution 827 creating the ICTY states
that the "situation [in Yugoslavia] continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security" and that the "establishment of an international tribunal and the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
humanitarian law
64
designed to help restore peace in the region by serving
The
ICTY
was
peace."
views of justice, including the right to a fair trial. 65 The
recognized
internationally
ICTY is composed of sixteen permanent judges from different states, 66 seven of
whom serve in an appeals chamber where five judges sit on any individual
appeal.67 The ICTY Statute also creates the Office of the Prosecutor who is
responsible for investigating and prosecuting persons accountable for "violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.,,68 The prosecutor is ultimately responsible for
determining whom to charge. 69
The creation of the ICTY is not the first time that a special international
tribunal has been created by an international organization for prosecuting war
criminals. 70 However, its creation and potential success or failure does come at a
significant time in history when countries of the world are working to define the
scope and power of the International Criminal Court (ICC) created by the Rome
Statute in 1998.
In order to understand the ICTY it is important to first understand the court's
primary predecessor, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. Although not
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, states: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
63. Security Council Resolution on Establishingan InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecutionof
Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalLaw and Humanitarianlaw Committed in

the Territoryof the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 84th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/827, 1993.
64. Id.
65. See id.,
see also AMENDED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ART. 21, availableat
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm.
66. See id at art. 12, para. I.
67. Id. at para. 3.
68. Id. at art. 16, paras. 1,3.
69. See id. at art. 18, paras. 1,4.
70. See BASS, supra note 3, at 5 (documenting six times when states have dealt with issues of
international justice prior to the creation of the ICTY these include trials of the Bonapartists in 1815
after the 100 Days War; trials of German war criminals after World War I; prosecution of Turk
perpetrators of the Armenian genocide; the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals; the trial of Japanese
war criminals in Tokyo; the current ex-Yugoslavia tribunal; and the trial for crimes that occurred in the
genocide in Rwanda).
71. See FinalReport of the Commission of Experts, supra note 44, at part IV
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the first international court, the Nuremberg Tribunal serves as a significant
example for how high-level politicians and senior military officers were put on
trial for their part in crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against
peace.72 The Nuremberg Tribunal, however, only judged the participation of Nazi
officials during World War 11.7 3 As such, the tribunal has been labeled as a sort of
"victors' justice, where the nationality of the judges and prosecutors were the
same as those who won the war.74 In fact, the Nuremberg Tribunal was created
several months after the end of the war in Europe by an agreement of the United
States, French, British, and Soviet representatives and did not include input from
others in the international community 7 The fledgling United Nations, created in
June 1945 could have provided the opportunity for international input in
establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal,76 but it was bypassed by the victorious
nations. 77
The Nuremberg Tribunal also established general principles of criminal
responsibility for individual state actors during wartime activities for international
law 78 This principle was later adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
79
as Resolution 95 (1).
This movement away from actions between states to
actions by states against individuals is a significant change in how the international
community is willing to prosecute individuals acting during times of war. Perhaps,
the world was appalled after learning about the acts of the Nazi's during the war
and sought some relief through what seemed to be a more humane and proper
treatment after all the bloodshed. Nonetheless, the Allied forces ran what some
have called "kangaroo courts" to prosecute those that had been vanquished 0
The Nuremberg Tribunal did not have the opportunity to try the major leaders
of the Nazi regime due to the fact that individuals such as Adolf Hitler, and several

72. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 27.
73. Id. at39 (stating that many modem scholars accept that activities undertaken by the Allied

forces, including fire-bombing of German cities and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, would constitute war crimes defined as "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,

or devastation not justified by military necessity").
74. Id.at 39.
75. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charterof the InternationalMilitary Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, pmbl., 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 (charter) [hereinafter Nuremberg Agreement and Tribunal] (in which the
governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of
America, the provisional government of the French Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics declared they were "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" in concluding their
agreement on how to prosecute German officials).
76. The United Nations Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945, while the International
Military Tribunal was signed and entered into force on August 8, 1945. See U.N. Charter, supra note
59; Nuremberg Agreement and Tribunal,supra note 72.
77. See NurembergAgreement and Tribunal, supra note 72.
78. U.N. Charter, supra note 59, at art. 6.
79. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(i), U.N. GAOR, IstSess., U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
80. See generally Richard Falk, Telford Taylor And The Legacy Of Nuremberg, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 693 (1999).
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key office holders, Heinrick Himmler and Josef Goebels, were already dead.8'
However, key actors such as General Herman Goering, and Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop, were tried and sentenced to death. 2 Recognizing that the
Tribunal was created by the victors, the chief prosecutor for the United States,
Robert E. Jackson, stated, "If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated
nation to be prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a
chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. 8 3 Even though a court of
victor nations conducted the trials, which effectively preordained the outcome,
those charged had the opportunity to plead their defense before a court.84 For
example, several of the lower ranking officers were eventually found not guilty
and set free. 5 The Nuremberg
Tribunal thus set the stage and the precedence for
86
trying war criminals.
Unlike Nuremberg, there were not yet any victors at the time of the creation
of the ICTY
Modern media coverage broadcasted war images worldwide,
including the images of prisoner of war camps reminiscent of the German death
camps of World War 11.87 International public opinion called for something to be
done, and the United Nations responded with the creation of the ICTY in 1993.88
The ICTY created an alternative to the costly use of military force by major
powers. It allowed the United Nations to make up for its inability to stop the war
by creating a tribunal to punish the perpetrators of crimes that the United Nations
was unable to prevent. 89
Although there was not a "victor" in the Balkan conflict, the Nuremberg
precedent of "victors' justice" was the image that the ICTY has attempted to avoid
with marginal success. 90 This desire for neutrality is buttressed by the unfortunate
reality that a criminal court's effectiveness is dependent on its ability to exercise
power over the criminal defendant. In order for a court to make an act by an
individual who is foreign to the court illegal, such as had been done with the
81. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 35.
82. Id. at 35-36, 38.
83. Id. at 40-41.
84. See id. at 39
85. Id. at 38.
86. Ii at 39. Justice Robert Jackson, on leave from the United States Supreme Court has been
credited with perhaps "the worst cross examination in history" for his treatment of Hermann Goenng.
His performance was of little matter, as Goering's guilt was predetermined. See Scott W Johnson and
John H. Hinderaker, Guidelines for Cross-Examination: Lessons from the Cross-Examination of
Hermann Goering, 59 OCT. BENCH & B. MiNN. 22 (2002).
87 National magazines in the United States, such as Time and Newsweek, ran full stories with
horrifying images and international film crews like the BBC and CNN delivered the images as well of
emaciated men in the Omarska, Kerraterm, and Trnopolje camps.
88. Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminal
Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440, 442 (1999).
89. Diplomatic attempts to stop the fighting between the former Yugoslav Republics continued to
fail until the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. From 1993 to 1995, the ICTY served as token action
by the international community towards an end to the conflict. BEIGBEDER, supra note 44, at 146-47
90. BASS, supra note 3, at 282. (quoting tribunal President Cassese, in reacting to the claims of
victors justice, as stating "this is truly international institution, it is an expression of the entire world
community, not the long arm of four powerful victors").
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Nuremberg Tribunal and now with Milosevic, the court must also have the power
to enforce its jurisdiction and to adjudicate the criminal matter. 9 1 The ICTY is able
to exist and prosecute Milosevic because of NATO's subsequent bombardment and
occupation of areas of the former Yugoslavia and the willingness of the Serbian
leadership to turn him over to the ICTY
3. The arrest and indictment
Milosevic remained in Serbia for several months after his resignation in
October 2000, even though he was a fugitive in the eyes of the international
community 92 The prosecutor for the ICTY indicted Milosevic during the second
NATO bombing campaign alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity 93
The indictment was issued sixty days into the NATO bombing campaign against
Serbia, on May 22, 1999 94
In April 200 1, almost two years after his indictment by the ICTY Serbian
police arrested Milosevic. 95 Upon his arrest and confinement in a Serbian prison,
President George W Bush released $50 million in aide to the Serbian republic for
its capture and detention of Milosevc. 96 It was not clear what would have
happened to Milosevic in the Serbian prison. By not acting however, it appears
that NATO and other world powers were willing to let Milosevic remain in
Serbian custody
In addition, the recently elected President Kostunica was
unwilling to turn Milosevic over to NATO powers.97 Then, seemingly overnight,
the United States and NATO changed gears, deciding that Milosevic should be
tried by the ICTY and conditioned an additional $1.28 billion in aid on the
surrender of Milosevic. 98
President Kostunica remained reluctant to turn over Milosevic to the ICTY 99
But in June 2001, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, a political rival, ordered
Serbian police to take Milosevic to an American airbase in Bosnia. 1° From there,
91. Alfred P Rubin, Pining Guilt on Pinochet, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp L. 371, 372 (2000)
(stating that "I know of no case in which war criminal or other supposed violator of "international
criminal law" from major power has ever been tried by a neutral tribunal").
92. Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Charge to be Announced Against Milosevic, WASH. POST,
May 27. 1999, at Al.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Not surprisingly, Milosevic was charged by the Serbian police with abuse of office and
embezzlement, not cnmes against humanity or genocide. Sam Cereste, The InternationalCourt of
Justice, the InternationalCriminalCourt,and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 17 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. Rts. 911,
913 (2001).
96. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 37
97. Id
98. Id. at 106. The requirement that Milosevic be turned over to the ICTY at The Hague served
almost as an overnight reversal of United States foreign policy. United States Senator Mitch
McConnell (R-KY) inserted an appropriations rider requiring that Milosevic be turned over to the
international court as pre-condition for receiving any additional funds. Id.
99. See Slobodan Milosevic Arrested, Charged with Corruption, UN WIRE, Apr. 2, 2001, at
http://www. unfoundation.org.
100. Marlise Simons and Carlotta Gall, The Handover of Milosevic, N.Y TiMES, June 29, 2001, at
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he was flown to The Hague, Netherlands, for trial by the ICTY for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. 0'' The
charges stated that Milosevic had "planned, instigated, ordered, [or] committed"
crimes prohibited by statute in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.10 2 The newly elected
government in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disagreed over the extradition,
which lead to the resignation of several members. However, two days after the
arrest of Milosevic, the Belgrade government was granted $1.28 billion in aid by
NATO allies, quieting much of the political unrest that had been brewing for the
new government. 103 The $1.28 billion put the world on notice regarding the
amount of money that would be necessary to bring the former leader to trial.
PART

Il -WHY

HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO MILOSEVIC

One might ask, "Why isn't Milosevic using the defense of bead of state
immunity to deny the ICTY from hearing his case?" A possible answer could be
that he has other defenses that go to show that he in fact did not make the orders to
carry out the killings by the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia, or
Kosovo. 1i 4 Another answer, and one that Milosevic appears to follow by not
raising the issue of head of state immunity, 10 5 is that traditional notions of
sovereign immunity are disappearing in international law Current trends in
international law show that criminally defined acts that are committed by any
individual, whether they are done while serving as head of state, constitute crimes
that may be tried by an international court. It will be argued that such crimes are
no longer afforded immunity as political realities outweigh any immunity defense.
This next section examines the deterioration of immunity for heads of states in
international criminal law and the impact it has on Milosevic's trial.
I Absolute immunity
Traditional notions of sovereignty hold that internationally recognized nations
are not to have their domestic affairs compromised by foreign nations. 106 This
notion of sovereignty allows the political body of a state within a specific territory
to be the sole arbiter of what constitutes legitimate behavior within that state. i07
While states can invite influence, such as in the form of financial or military aid,
the ruling political entity remains the sole decision maker for the state leaving
Al.
101. Id.
102. See Indictment of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, IT-0 1-51 - I,

(1999).
103. SCHARF, supranote 18, at 37.
104. In fact a major issue facing the prosecution is the fact that Serb forces did not keep paper
trail of orders, and most if any orders from Milosevic were made orally.
105. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 105.
106. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 19 (Princeton University Press
1999). The term absolute sovereignty stems from the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 creating
ideas of the modem state and allowing for actions within a state to be free from foreign scrutiny.
107. Id. at 20.
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foreign states unable to interfere with the inner workings of the sovereign state.'

0

This notion of sovereignty also applied to heads of state who held immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution at any point while serving as head of state or
after their tenure.' 0 9 In Kahan v. Pakistan Federation,iiOthe English court held
that a "foreign sovereign is entitled to immunity from civil proceedings in the
courts of any other country, unless, upon being sued, he actively elects to waive his
privilege and to submit to the jurisdiction."' ' i While the action against the
Pakistan Federation was a civil claim for a breach of contract,' 12 the court stated,
"It is established beyond question
that a mere agreement by a foreign sovereign
to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this country is wholly ineffective if the
foreign sovereign chooses to resile from it."' 1' 3 The Pakistan Federation's
agreement allowed the English court to resolve contract disputes, 1 4 but Pakistan
later chose not to grant such jurisdiction when the matter came before the court.' i5
Because of the rule granting immunity to the sovereign of a state, the court
dismissed the complaint.i6 Kahan serves as an example of the application of
absolute immunity where no state has jurisdiction in adjudicating claims against
the sovereign state or its political head.
2. Restrictive immunity
The traditional notion of granting immunity to a head of state continued well
into the last decade of the twentieth century in United States courts as shown by
the case of the former president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whowas elected
in December 1990.117 An unsuccessful military coup was attempted against
President Aristide in January 1991, shortly after his election.iS However, in
September of the same year, Aristide fled Haiti after a second, and this time
successful, coup.ii 9 While in exile, a resident of New York filed suit against
President Aristide for killing her husband, Dr. Roger Lafontant, in federal district
court in New York. 120 The complaint alleged that President Aristide ordered the
execution of Dr. Lafontant shortly before Aristide was exiled because of the

108. Id. at21.
109. See Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, I Q.B. 149 (1893) (finding that

foreign sovereign acting as

private individual and residing in England under an assumed name had sovereign immunity for
breach of contract even though he had concealed the fact that he was a sovereign).
110. Kahan v. Pakistan Fed'n, 2 K.B. 1003 (1951).
Ill. Id.
at 1013 (emphasis added) (quoting Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, I Q.B. 149 (1983)).
12. See id.
at 1003.
113. Id. at 1012.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1016
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1016.
See U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Haiti, Apr. 2002, available at

hftp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
118. Id.
119. See id.

120. Lafontant v. Anstide, 844 F Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y 1994).

2004

THE DEMISE OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY

doctor's participation in the failed coup attempt in January 1991.121 Applying
22
common law notions of absolute immunity, the court dismissed the complaint.
The court said that a "head of state recognized by the United States government is
absolutely immune from personal jurisdiction in United States courts unless that
immunity has been waived by statute or by the foreign government recognized by
the United States."' 23 The court reasoned that President Aristide, although in exile
in the United States at the time of trial, 24 was recognized as the Head of State of
Haiti by the United States government.125 As such, the court did not have
jurisdiction regardless of whether Aristide committed
a crime that was not in
26
furtherance of his official function as president.
This similar doctrine of absolute immunity was claimed by General Manuel
Antonio Noriega, but with a different result. 27 Noriega served as commander of
the Panamanian Defense Forces when Panama's President Eric Arturo Delvalle
asked for his resignation.' 28 Noriega refused, and Delvalle was voted out of
power. 29 The United States then invaded Panama with a significant military force
and Noriega surrendered to United States forces after several days of seeking
asylum with the Holy See. 30 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Noreiga's claims of
head of state immunity stating, "the Executive Branch [President George H. Bush]
has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head of state
immunity ,131
By granting such deference to the executive branch of the federal government
m both instances, the United States' Executive is able to determine who should
receive immunity, disregarding the long held tenants of absolute immunity for
heads of state. Just by recognizing a nation and its leader as legitimate allows that
nation to be granted immunity for his or her actions while leader of that state.
Such a blanket grant of power to the executive branch of government may appear
overstated. However, the current trend in the doctrine of immunity allows
international public opinion (or the opinion in the powerful countries) to decide
121. Id. at 130.

122. Id. at 139.
123. Id. at 131-32.
124. President Anstide did not return to power until October 1994, after the United States led a
21,000 strong force to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. The Resolution
authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore the elected government to power. See
U.S. Department of State, BackgroundNote: Haiti, Apr. 2002, supra note 114.
125. See Lafontant, 844 F Supp. at 121.
126. Id. at 130. If, for example, the ICTY had jurisdiction over Aristide, he could be charged under
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, with crimes against humanity for acts conducted against civilian
populations in Haiti since his return. See Human Rights Watch, Haiti, the Human Rights Record of the
Haitian National Police (Jan.
1997)
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/
haiti/Haiti.htm#P62_1831 (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (documenting several instances where the state
run police, the Haitian National Police, has conducted extra-judicial executions and acceptance by the
government of beatings and other abuses of civilian populations).
127 United States v. Nonega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1997).
128. Id.at 1209.
129. Id.at 1209-10.
130. Id.
131. Id.at 1212.
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who should be granted immunity Had the crime by President Aristide been
different, or more importantly had it not been President Anstide, perhaps the court
would have come to a different result. United States courts see head of state
immunity not as "a matter of right but rather 'a matter of grace and comity"' where
immunity is granted to those friendly with the nation. 132
3. Deteriorationof immunity protectionfor heads of state
The trial of Augusto Pinochet, the former leader of Chile, signaled a change
in how nations deal with head of state immunity for crimes defined in international
law i33 Pinochet ruled as President of Chile from 1973 to 1990 when he became a
Senator for Life pursuant to the Chilean Constitution, and served as Commanderin-Chief for the army for another eight years. 34 Throughout his rule, over 3,000
political opponents were killed or "disappeared,"'1 35 some of whom were Spanish
nationals. 136 In 1998 Pinochet was visiting the United Kingdom for medical
treatment when he was arrested following his back surgery 137 The Spanish
government requested his extradition to Spain charging Pinochet with murder,
genocide, torture, and conspiracy to torture. 38 A divided panel of the House of
Lords ruled that the doctrine of head of state immunity did not apply to actions that
were inconsistent with international law "9 Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that
Pinochet would not be entitled to immunity if he "organised and authorised torture
after 8 December 1988,140 [for] he was not acting in any capacity which gives rise
to immunity ratione materiae because such actions were contrary to international
law" to which Chile had agreed. 4 1 Because Pinochet's actions in ordering the
torture of certain individuals did not constitute an official function in his role as
head of state, the court decided to allow for his extradition to Spain to stand trial.' 42
Although Pinochet has not yet stood trial before the court due to health reasons, the
decision of the House of Lords indicates a clear departure from the historical

132. See Ved P Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign Immunity and Individual Immunities
(Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity) - Some
Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 467, 475 (1999).
133. See Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of lmmunity: England's House of Lords Holds that
FormerHead of State is not Immune for Torture, 14 TEMP INT'L & COMp L.J. 263 (2000).
134. Id. at264-65.
135. Id. at 265.
136. Id at 266.
137. Id. at 266-67
138. Mike Meier & John. R. Schmertz, House of Lords Rules that Crimes of Torture Allegedly
Committed During Pinochet Regime in Chile are Extraditable to Extent they Occurred After
Ratification of Torture Convention by Chile, Spain and United Kingdome in late 1988; Head of State
Immunity Held Inapplicableto Torture Chargesas Jus Cogens Offenses, 5 INT'L L. UPDATE 41 (1999).
139. Id.
140. In 1998, the United Kingdom adopted the International Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, allowing for the prosecution of individuals
charged with torture.
141. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm of Policefor the Metropolis & Others Er Parte Pinochet, 38
I.L.M. 581, 594 (1999).
142. Id. at 643.
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notions of head of state immunity. Even if the acts were official, they may still
violate international law
The dissenters took a narrower view of what activities constitute official
duties. 143 Lord Millet stated that just by agreeing to the Torture Convention, Chile
had not waived immunity for its former head of state. 144 Pinochet's acts were in
fact government acts: signing orders designed to be camed out by government
officials. Head of state functions, according to the dissenters, are not to be
determined by international law, as even an oppressive government is still a
government. 145
In times of conflict, immunity has not been granted to those who were beaten.
146
Rather, immunity is often used as a bargaining chip to bring about an end.
Immunity is used by powerful nations to encourage regime changes. 147 For
example, to encourage peaceful transitions of power, the United Nations has
helped negotiate amnesty for leaders of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the
1 48
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and leaders of the military regime in Haiti.
Furthermore, states (and the public opinion within those states) have become more
willing, as is evident with Milosevic, to try individual leaders in their executive
capacity due in part to an increasing significance and acceptance of international
human rights law 149 Much like the Nuremberg court, the desire to put leaders on
trial for their actions after the international community has decided to act plays an
important role m deciding who is tried and for what crimes.
Professor Stephen Krasner calls sovereignty an "organized hypocrisy" where
the sovereignty of nations is "frequently compromised through intervention in the
form of coercion or imposition by more powerful states, or through contracts or
conventions that have involved invitations for external actors to influence domestic
authority structures."' 50 Where a nation and its leaders are free to act within their
particular borders, traditional notions of sovereignty are only followed or agreed to
when major nations lack the will to intervene. Professor Krasner states that nations

143. Id. at 652.
144. Id. at 651 (Lord Millet).
145. See Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England' House of Lords Holds that
Former Headof State is not immune for Torture, 14 TEMP INT'L & COMP L.J. 263, 291 (2000).
146. Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdictionof the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNEL IN'TL. L.J. 507 514 (1999) (stating "When the international community encourages
or endorses amnesty for human rights abuses, it sends signal to other rogue regimes that they have
nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures. Such regimes can always bargain away their crimes
by agreeing to peace").
147. See generally Larry Rohter, Mission to Haiti,N.Y TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994 at Al.
148. SCHARF, supranote 18, at 48-9

149.

JURGEN BROHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTs

221 (Kluwer

Law International 1997). Jurgen Brohmer argues that the growing jurisprudence of international
humanitarian law contradicts many of the notions of sovereign immunity. It is further argued that
notions of sovereign immunity should be further restncted when there are violations of human rights
through the adoption of a Convention on State Immunity that allows for adjudication of violations of
human rights in another state effectively allowing states to try leaders in foreign jurisdiction for
violations of humanitarian law.
150. KRASNER, supra note 103, at 125, 220.
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have intervened in certain target nations for state intolerance of minority
populations or religious factions when there was support within the intervening
nation for such intervention.1 5 1 United States foreign policy set by the Executive
Branch, specifically the State Department, not theoretical notions of state
sovereignty determined the outcomes of Noriega and Aristide. Both leaders
claimed to be the head of state for their respective nations, and for practical
purposes each was the acting head of state, but the label used by the State
Department allowed the courts to make their respective judgments. As applied to
Milosevic, only after images of forced relocations of ethnic Albanians from the
Republic of Kosovo and reports of killings and rapes did NATO breach
Yugoslavian sovereignty with a major bombing campaign (keeping its forces
mostly out of harm's way). Also at this point, the ICTY delivered its indictment of

Milosevic. 152

4. ICTY statute and immunity
The statute of the ICTY does not provide immunity protection for any persons
charged in the former Yugoslavia. 153 In so doing, the United Nations Security
Council decided that notions of absolute or even restrictive immunity would not
apply i54 The statute gives the tribunal the power to prosecute "a person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided" in the commission of a
breach of the 1949 Geneva Convention, violation of the law of war, genocide, or
crime against humanity ,,155 The statute further states that, "the official position of
any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government
shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."' 156 In enacting the
statute, the tribunal does away with the head of state immunity defense for actions
undertaken while serving in the capacity of head of state or other official
position. 157
Even though the statute allows for the prosecution of Milosevic in his role as
head of state, 58 such an activity was probably not necessary. The statute codifies
the demise of any notion of immunity for officials acting against the norms
established by the ICTY 159 New notions allowing for the prosecution of heads of
state for their participation, albeit from a removed leadership role of giving orders
or even just knowing that such acts are occumng, in war crimes and crimes against
humanity would have allowed for the prosecution of Milosevic in other criminal
courts. As one scholar stated, "If there is a conflict between the interests of the

151.

Id. at 125-26.
152. The Milosevic indictment was delivered on November 22, 2001.
153. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 25, 1994) Res. 827 (as
amended May 13, 1998 by Res. 1166 & Nov. 30, 2000 by Res. 1329).
154. Id.

155. Id. at art. 7, para. I.
156. Id. at para. 2.
157. Id.

158. See id. at art. 7, para. 2.
159. Id. atpara. 1.
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state and the interest of the individual it can no longer be maintained that the
interests of the state must always and per se prevail."'160 Gross violations of human
rights may cause nations to intervene and violate sovereignty for the stated purpose
of ending such violations, as in the Balkan states, and be approved by international
law.
5. Extraditionof Milosevic
Milosevic, on his flight to The Hague with his United States captors and
officials from the ICTY claimed he was being kidnapped. 161 The ICTY rejected
this argument of kidnapping in violation of international law on the basis that a
formal extradition treaty existed between the court and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.162 The ICTY is unable to enter Yugoslavia and capture any of the
indicted individuals and is dependent upon international cooperation for capturing
war criminals like Milosevic. 63 Without a police force, it is reliant upon other
nations to enforce its junsdiction over any of the "fugitives" that It seeks. 164
The Milosevic arrest is not the first instance of international kidnapping
sanctioned by the courts. One of the most well known abductions was the
abduction of former Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann by an Israeli Special Forces unit
while he was in Argentina after World War 11.165 Although Israel was forced to
pay reparations to Argentina for violations of its sovereignty 166 the actual
kidnapping was allowed. 67 Eichmann faced trial by the Israeli court and was
eventually convicted and put to death for his participation in killing of millions of
Jews dunng World War 11.168 This was also the case with the arrest of Panamanian
General Noriega who was carted off to a United States court after soldiers invaded
Panama. 169Following the United States Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
Alvarez-Machan, 170 the court adjudicating the claims against Nonega said that in
order to prevail on an extradition treaty claim, Noriega had to show that the United

160. BROHMER, supra note 146.
161. SCHARF, supra note 18, at 106.

162. Id.
163. See Judge Gabnelle Kirk McDonald, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov.
8, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p445-e.

164. Id.
165. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (Penguin Books 1994) (1963).
166. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 867th mtg., at 1-2, S/P V 867 (1960). For history of the
diplomatic efforts between Argentina and Israel, see Mathew Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolf
Eichmann and the Quest for Global Justice, 8 BUFF HUM. RTS. L. REv. 45, 54-64 (2002).
167. Id.
168. in addition to the issues regarding Eichmann's extradition from Argentina, Eichmann's
appearance created an obvious fiction in Israeli law where the accused is deemed innocent until
proven
guilty. In explaining why Israel had violated Argentine law, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion said, "it
was Eichmann who organized the mass murder, on a gigantic and unprecedented scale. See ARENDT,
supra note 166.
169 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210 (1Ith Cir. 1997).
170. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that the abduction of a
criminal defendant from nation with whom United States has extradition treaty is not in violation of
treaty and may be tried in district court for criminal law violations).
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States had agreed not to seize him.' 7
Professor Sheri Burr poses the question of whether kidnapped individuals
accused of human rights violations possess a legal right to be brought before an
international court. 72 Her answer is no, claiming that such actions are not morally
or legally justified and makes citizens of states feel less secure.7 3 Furthermore,
she argues that the kidnapping of alleged offenders erases thei rights to fair trials
and benefits the powerful states that have the means to conduct a successful
kidnapping. 74 Although these concerns may be valid, so long as the nation is
allowed reparations for the violation of its territorial integrity, and there is a desire
by the international community to see that the individual is brought before a
tribunal, the international community appears willing to allow for the kidnapping
of officials and others. 75 While the ICTY has decided that it does have
jurisdiction over individuals who are brought to stand trial before it against their
will, 176 the question remains how other courts, such as the ICC, will be able to
assert jurisdiction over an individual brought before it.
PART III -RATIONALIZING

MILOSEVIC's TRIAL

The indictment of Milosevic was handed down in May 1999 sixty days after
the NATO bombing campaign began, eight years after the conflict in Yugoslavia
started, four years after Milosevic signed the Dayton Peace Accords, and well
after the arrival of thousands of United Nations peacekeeping troops. It came at a
time when support in NATO nations for activities in the former Yugoslavia was
declining. 177 The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the use of
cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions on military and civilian targets,
strengthened political opposition in NATO countries. 178 It appears that the
Milosevic indictment was delivered at such a time to show that an end of the
conflict, and therefore foreign involvement, was in sight and there was a goal of
arresting and bringing to justice international war criminals.
1. Non-cooperation of Yugoslav republics
Since the creation of the ICTY the main problem that the tribunal has faced
has been its inability to arrest and put on trial the leaders in the former Yugoslavia
responsible for the atrocities. With the exception of Milosevic, the other major
171. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1213.
172. Sherr L. Burr, From Nortega to Pinochet: is there an International Moral and Legal Right to
Kidnap Individuals Accused of Gross Human Rights Violations, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101
(2001).
173. Id. at 14.
174. Id at 112.
175. See Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. at 655.
176. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, IT-94-I-A (1997) (stating
"The Statute grants competence to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the terrtory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991").
177 SCHARF,supra note 18, at 102.
178. Id.
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Bosnian-Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic have been charged with
war crimes but remain at-large.' 79 As of March 2004, the ICTY has issued over
110 indictments with ninety-one individuals in proceedings before the tribunal.' 80
Twenty indicted individuals however, remain at large.1'1 Without any enforcement
power at its disposal, the ICTY has relied upon "dumb luck" for finding and
arresting those before the tribunals. 182 The current governments of the nations
making up the former Yugoslavia have been reluctant to turn over war criminals to
the Tribunal, putting into question the court's effectiveness. 8 3 The United States
has made some efforts to pressure the nations of the former Yugoslavia into
cooperating with the ICTY 184 In May 2002, a freeze on financial assistance was
lifted and roughly $40 million in aid and $300 million in frozen assets185were handed
over after Yugoslav officials agreed to respond to document requests.
Former ICTY President Claude Jorda recently complained, "The Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is not co-operating m tracking down, arresting and
transferring to The Hague certain of the accused. '' is 6 While arrest warrants have
been issued and evidence for other indictments requested, these requests have been
summarily ignored. 187 The refusal to cooperate extends beyond Serbia. For
example, Croatia has refused to turn over General Janko Bobetko, indicted for
killing over 100 Serbs in a 1993 military campaign, with the official position that
the massacre was part of a legitimate military operation. 188 However, since some
leaders in Serbia saw fit to allow United States troops to take Milosevic to The
Hague rather than see him tried in Serbian courts, the ICTY has its first "big
Therefore, the inability of the ICTY to function without international
catch.
assistance is a major weakness of the court.
2. Factorscausing internationalintervention
NATO's intervention into the Balkan region poses several questions as to the
legality of the act under international law.'8 9 Article 2 (4) of the United Nations
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.

182. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 18, at 250-51 (describing an arrest that took place in January of
1996 when Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic took a wrong turn in
the city of Sarajevo and ran into the Bosnian police who promptly arrested them even though neither
had been indicted by the ICTY The two were transferred to a Bosnian jail where French soldiers took
them away to a United States airbase and then to The Hague. Upon their arrival, prosecutors scrambled
and General Djukic received an indictment and Colonel Krsmanovic was eventually set free).
183. BEIGBEDER, supranote 44, at 161-2.
184. Bruce Zagaris, Yugoslav Tribunal Flourishing,18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 310 (2002)
185. Id.
186. Hague TribunalCallsfor UN Pressureon Belgrade, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 23, 2002.
187. Id.
188. Britain Demands CroatiaAccept Indictment of War Criminal,AP NEWSWIRES, Oct. 15, 2002.
189. For example, the Russian Federation proposed a United Nations Security Council resolution to
require NATO to cease bombing and declare the act as unlawful but was vetoed by the NATO states.
See Security Council Rejects Demandfor Cessation of Use of Force against Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, UN press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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charter asks members to "refrain" from the "threat of force or use of force" in
conducting their international relations.' 90 The Article was violated by NATO's
threat and ultimate use of air strikes against Yugoslavia.' 9' However, since the end
of the Cold War, there has been a shift in international law that allows for the
justification of intervention on "humanitarian" terms; internal conflicts involving
human rights violations or other crimes against humanity pose a threat to
92
international peace and security and thereby provide the authority to intervene.
In addition to sending peacekeeping troops to the Balkans, the United Nations has
attempted such humanitanan intervention in Somalia, Rwanda, and in East
Timor. 93 In Somalia, however, United Nations, and United States, casualties
quickly turned the stomach of nations sending peacekeeping forces.194 The United
Nations' failure in Somalia to stop warring factions led to its reluctance to
intervene in Rwanda 195 and then later to deploy troops in Bosnia'96 but to keep
them out of harm's way. But, the prospects of providing humanitarian assistance
to the Kosovars, after the international community witnessed the ramifications of
earlier failures including efforts97 m Bosnia, allowed NATO to act albeit without
Security Council authorization.1
Professor Gary Bass argues that there are limits for when a liberal, or
democratic, state will act. 198 The idealism that can cause a state to act against the
"face of foreign wickedness" can also cause a turning away and abandonment of
the pursuit ofjustice.199 According to Professor Bass, there are a number of factors
that cause a liberal state to pursue war criminals through an international criminal
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
191. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, Kosovo: A Thin Red
Line, 10 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1999), also available at http://www.ejil.org/joumai/Voli0/Nol/abi2.html#Heading2.
192. See Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian
Intervention, 93 A.J.I.L. 824, 825 (1999) (arguing that unless the military action is sanctioned by the
Security Council, unilateral or even collective action such as the NATO bombing of Serbia after its
invasion of Kosovo, is unlawful); see also Ved P Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign and Individual
Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity) Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 467 (1999) (arguing that a human rights exception ought
to be added to the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "to allow the law to catch up with
the monumental progress of international human rights law").
193. See Background Note, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Jan. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.un.org/peace/bnote0O0i.pdf.
194. See e.g., Editorial, The UnitedNations at 50, N.Y TIMES, June 26, 1995, at AI4.
195. Secretary General Kofi Annan said, "Confronted by gross violations of human rights in
Rwanda and elsewhere, the failure to intervene was driven more by the reluctance of Member States to
pay the human and other costs of intervention, and by doubts that the use of force would be successful,
than by concerns about sovereignty.
See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization,U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. Mtg., at I, U.N. Doc. A/54 PV 4 (1999).
196. Id.
197. See Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, Kosovo: A Thin Red Line, 10
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1999) (stating "we would be well advised to
regard the Kosovo Crisis as a
singular case in which NATO decided to act without Security Council authorization out of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, but from which no general conclusion out to be drawn).
198. See generally BASS, supra note 3.
199. Id. at 5.
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court. 20° These factors are a sense of legal norms, desire to protect the intervening
nation's soldiers over the lives of foreigners, an appearance that there has been war
against the liberal states, public opinion is such that the outrage is able to influence
the democratic process, and there is pressure by non-state actors such as nongovernmental organizations. 2 1 In applying these factors, it makes sense why the
United Nations chose to establish a tribunal rather than use ground forces to stop
the war in the region. The United States and the international community did not
want to intervene forcefully but were willing to make the effort to provide a court
where those responsible for the carnage would be brought to justice. The United
States' reluctance to intervene during the height of the conflict in the early 1990's
was evident when President Bill Clinton in May 1993, refused again to send troops
to the region saying "we don't want our people in there, basically in a shooting
gallery. 2 °2 It was not until the downing of an American pilot and the capture of
three American soldiers in 1999 did support for more action grow in the United
States and NATO intensified its air bombings.0 3
There are numerous places where an international tribunal such as the ICTY
could be applied but the international community has decided not to take action
against the heads of state even after they have left their positions and are either
living or have lived abroad. Some of these suspected criminals include: Pol Pot,
leader of the Khmer Rouge and head of state during the killing fields in
Cambodia; 204 Idi lmm, former ruler of Uganda, who lives in exile and is suspected
of over 300,000 politically motivated killings; 20 5 Mengistu Haile Mariam, former
Ethiopian dictator, also in exile, and allegedly responsible for up to I million
Ethiopian deaths; 206 Jean Claude Duvalier, former Haitian President, who along
with his father are estimated to have ordered the deaths of between twenty and
thirty thousand Haitian civilians; 20 7 and former Indonesian General Suharto who
may be responsible for thousands of civilian deaths when he came to power in the
mid 1960's, and later when Indonesian forces invaded East Timor in 1975.20s
Where the United Nations has decided to intervene there have been results. 2°9
Former Prime minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, was sentenced to life in prison
200. Id.
201. Id. at 29-35.
202. Quoted in id. at 214.
203. See George Jahn, Captured US Soldiers To Be Tried, ASSOCIATED PRESS Apr. 1, 1999.
204. No state was willing to put Pol Pot on trial for his actions as leader and died prior to the
establishment of tribunal similar to the ICTY All but two of the prominent Khemr Rouge figures
remain free. See Mary Margaret Penrose, It's Good to be the King!: ProsecutingHeads of State and
FormerHeads of State Under InternationalLaw, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193, n. 9-10 (2000).
205. Id. at note i1.
206. Id. at note 12.
207. See Human Rights Watch, Haiti, Thirstfor Justice, a Decade of Impunity in Haiti, 1996,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Haiti.htm (crediting the Duvaliers with driving hundreds
of thousands of Hatians into exile, fleeing official torture and murder).
208. Suharto Crimes Against Humanity, INSIDE INDONESIA DIGEST 60, May 22, 1998, available
at http://www.nsideindonesia.org/digest/dig6O.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (arguing for an
international criminal tribunal similar to the ICTY for crimes committed by the Suharto regime).
209. Id.
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for crimes against humanity and genocide against the civilian Tutsi population in
Rwanda. 2 1' Kambanda was turned over to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda after Kenyan authorities arrested him.21 ' This dynamic, where certain
individuals are prosecuted, or even indicted, is representative of a system of
international law that is "constrained on one end by voluntary compliance of
consenting sovereign states and on the other by the political deadlock of the
moment.",212 Only after the international community achieves a political will and
states which are harboring suspected criminals opt to participate are those who
caused the atrocities put to trial. It took a significant NATO bombing campaign, a
regime change, and the arrest and subsequent middle of the night extradition, for
Milosevic to come to trial.21 3
While the world continues to sit idle as other atrocities continue, the desire of
the ICTY to avoid appearances of "victors' justice" is doomed. Without the
consistent application of international law to all individuals, the stigma and
precedent of the Nuremberg court will remain. "In the last analysis, the two
international war crimes tribunals in The Hague and Arusha stand largely as
testaments to the failure of America and the West. Had the West managed to
summon the political will to stop the slaughters in Rwanda and Bosnia, there
would have been no need for these two fragile experiments in international
justice. 2t 4 Professor Bass sees the experience of the war crime tribunals as having
potential to work.2 15 But with the exception of Nuremberg, they have not worked
as well as possible.21 6 The ICTY began with a lengthy trial of an insignificant
player, Dusko Tadic, not the way that would have given the tribunal the legitimacy
or recognition that it needed.2i 7 Now with the potential that Milosevic may
continue his lengthy trial to his death, or even to victory as some have questioned,
the lack of success of the ICTY to prosecute the high-ranking officials of the
Balkan conflict may spell the practical demise of a functioning and operational
International Criminal Court.

210. See The Prosecutor v. Jena Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence of Sept. 4, 1998, ICTR 97-23S, availableat http://www.ictr.org, (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
211. Id.
212. See Penrose, supra note 201.
213. BASS, supra note 3 at 240 (stating that at the end of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995,
seventy-percent of the American public did not want to see troops in Bosnia: one poll conducted by the
White House stated that the last thing that American troops should be used for was arresting war
criminals)., See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International

Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 340 (1999) (arguing that courts such as the ICTY should
not precede the end of a conflict without first establishing a mechanism to ensure enforcement); See
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Trial Chamber,
Sentencing Judgment (May 29, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm; see also
Article 24 of the Statute of the ICTY (stating that "the penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be
limited to imprisonment").
214. BASS, supra note 3, at 283.
215. Id. at310.
216. Id.
217 Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm.
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PART

IV - THE LEGACY OF THE TRIAL

The trial of Slobodan Milosevic brings many "firsts" to international criminal
trials. In addition to the first trial of a head of state for war crimes, the trial has
brought wartime adversaries into the opposing sides of a courtroom, with one head
of state testifying against another. 2t 8 The trial of Milosevic, and others at The
Hague, will have lasting impacts in the region and the world, especially with the
creation of the ICC, as Milosevic's trial 2is9 certain to be a "harbinger of [the] future
when there will be more trials like this.,, 1
I Impact in theformer Yugoslavia

The international community hopes that the Milosevic trial and the ICTY will
help create some healing in the former Yugoslavia. 220 This in part has already
happened with the uneventful reelection attempt of Vojislav Kostunica as President
of the Republic of Yugoslavia.22' Milosevic's trial also has played an important
role m increasing the tribunal's effectiveness and credibility 222 Furthermore, the
trial may help educate the people of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Serbia, and the world as to what happened so that such acts do not occur in the
future. However, reliance upon the tribunal to prosecute war cnminals by the
governments of the Balkan states has not served to develop local war crimes
prosecutions in the regions of the former Yugoslavia.223
In order for the ICTY to meet its goals, the international community should
take a sincere interest in the ICTY's operations. The yearly budget of the ICTY
has increased from $276,000 in 1993 to over $223,000,000 for 2002-2003 and a
staff of 1238 from eighty-four countries.224 Yet, with the increase in staff and
resources, the ICTY continues to face critical resource shortages. 225 It also
struggles with logistical problems such as providing a place where convicted war
criminals are to be imprisoned; making it reliant upon United Nations member
states to house convicted criminals.226 The ICTY also does not have any
218. Marlise Simons, CroatLeader Says Milosevic Made "Rivers of Blood N.Y TIMES, Oct. 2,

2002, at A7 (describing the testimony of Croatian President Stjepan Mesic against Milosevic, and
appearing as the first head of state to appear as witness at the ICTY).
219. Id. (quoting Richard Dicker).
220. Id.
221. See Misha Savic, President Kostunica Carries on Legal Battle over Failed Elections, AP
NEWSWiREs, Dec. 14, 2002 (reporting that some argue that there is a lack of interest in that not enough

people are voting to satisfy the constitutional requirements).
222. See David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Unforeseen Successes and ForeseeableShortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F WORLD AFF 7 (2002) (arguing

that the increase in credibility comes after NATO troops allowed indicted individuals, such as Mladic
and Karadzic, to pass through checkpoints without arrest).
223. Id. at 15 (citing the failure of the ICTY to have a significant impact on the region's justice
system as amajor failure of the ICTY "tamish[ing] the successes that the tribunal has seen").
224. Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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enforcement mechanisms to make sure that those who are indicted are brought to
trial.227 As it is, the ICTY is dependent upon NATO and the United Nations to
bring the indicted individuals to tral.228 Without a police force and a jail, the basic
necessities of a criminal justice system, 229 it promises to continue to be an uphill
battle of legitimacy for the ICTY
The ICTY was created in the midst of fighting in Yugoslavia.23 ° Cries for an
end to the conflict from those who became refugees, lost loved ones, or had their
homes destroyed found little comfort when the international community sent
resources to the establishment of a court in The Hague to try those who were at the
time in the act of causing harm. 3' It will be hard for those who were forced to flee
their homeland from the fighting and destruction to not be skeptical of promises of
justice. Unlike the Nuremberg Trials, where the sentence of death was possible,
the ICTY statute limits punishment to imprisonment. 232 Concerns over the
legitimacy of the death penalty aside, the inability to impose such a penalty may
also cause greater skepticism that "justice" will be done when those who have lost
all that they have seek vengeance rather than "justice. 233
2. Impact on the establishment ofthe ICC
In an attempt to do away with ad hoc criminal tribunals, the United Nations
General Assembly convened the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plempotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Court, which created the
Rome Statute of the ICC. 234 Nations within the international community have been
trying for some time to establish such a court 235 before the statute came into effect
on July 1, 2002.236 The ICC was created to prosecute those responsible for
international crimes. 23 7 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, "In
the Prospect of an international court lies the promise of universal justice." 238 The
227. Id.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Penrose,supra note 210.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, supra note 2 10.
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International Criminal Court

Overview,

available

at

http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/ overview.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
235. Id. (discussing the history dating back fifty years from when the United Nations first
recognized the need to establish an international criminal court).
236. The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plempotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court adopted the statute creating the ICC on July 17, 1998, in Rome, Italy.
There are currently 139 signatories to the treaty, and eighty-four who have ratified it. Although the
United States signed the treaty in 2000, in May of 2002, the United States withdrew from the treaty.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status, available at

http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVlII/ treatyl0.asp (last visited
Nov. 19, 2002).
237 Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9
(1998), reprinted in37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) (hereinafter Rome Statute).
238. Id.
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goal of the ICC to help end conflict, to act when other criminal justice institutions
are unwilling, and deter future war criminals 239 is dependent upon being able to
exercise jurisdiction over the "wrong-doers.
The ICC will have jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole" including the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.240 Just like the ICTY
the ICC does not recognize head of state immunity 241 The statute states, "official
capacity as a Head of State.
shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for
reduction of sentence. 242
Many see the ICTY as a trial run for how the ICC will proceed.243 Some
commentators claim that the ICC does not solve the problems that are inherent in
international criminal justice.2 " Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald in her address to
the United Nations said, "Mr. President, the international community is in the
initial stages of establishing the ICC. Make no mistake about it: if the international
community does not ensure that the orders of the Court are enforced, it is bound to
go the way of the League of Nations. 245 Without an international police force to
enforce violations of international criminal law, the effect of the ICC would be to
serve as an international reprimand for criminal acts. Indictments, such as those
delivered by the ICTY against the Bosmans Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic,
would go unheeded unless there is some incentive for the country to turn over the
individual or unless it has no choice.
The ICC foresees a world where nation states will assist in the
implementation and enforcement of international law 246 Enforcement mechanisms
of the ICC are similar to the ICTY with both placing a "general obligation to
cooperate" upon states in the prosecution and investigation, 24' 7 and leaving states to
"continue to pursue their own self-interests at the cost of enforcing international
law., 248 The court can only work effectively with participation at all times by all

239. Id.
240. Id. at art. 5, see. I.
241. Id. at art. 27, sec. 2.
242. Id. at art. 27, sec. I.
243. See David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of International Law, 26 FLETCHER F WORLD
AFF 7, 8 (2002) (stating, "The ICTY has grown into an effective court, which has painstakingly
administered trials that are widely perceived as fair. In the process, the tribunal's judges have developed
an important body of international law and criminal procedure that will serve as critical guideposts for
the ICC as well as other prosecutions for serious violations of international humanitarian law.").
244. See William Miller, Comment, Slobodan Milosevic Prosecution by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Harbinger of Things to Come for International
Criminal Justice, 22 LOY L.A. INT'L & COMP L. REV.553 (2000) (citing the potential major problems
with the ICC are issues of state sovereignty and cooperation of states as well as overcoming political
obstacles).
245. See Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov.
8, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p445-e.
246. See Penrose, supra note 210, at 352.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 356. Professor Penrose continues, "International criminal law cannot depend on the
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involved. However, as seen with Milosevic, states are willing to satisfy their selfinterests and provide a court to resolve disputes or try criminals when it satisfies
those interests.
3. What if Milosevic wins?
Milosevic, who is a trained lawyer, has so far put on a good show. The
question then, is what happens if the prosecution is unable to tie him to making the
orders to conduct the mass executions and other crimes that he is charged with
committing and, as a result, he wins. Of course, it is not clear what will happen;
presumably if he wins, he would return to Serbia and face whatever trial may be
conducted for abuse of power. If convicted, he would likely serve the rest of his
life in a European prison.249 But the end result to Milosevic, who may not even be
able to finish the trial based upon his failing health, is perhaps insignificant
compared to the precedent that his trial will establish in trying heads of state before
the ICC.
If Milosevic wins, then the international community may be less likely in the
future to seek out war criminals and bring them before a tribunal. It would appear
easier and a less lengthy process to attempt to kill the leaders either by
assassination or bombing then go through the long drawn out process of a trial with
the potential of not convicting the leader. 250 If Milosevic loses, then nations will
have a precedent regarding the level of resources required to convict such an
individual. States may also require bribes and/or bounties in order to turn over
suspected criminals, as has been the case with the ICTY 251
Cases that will go to the ICC are those where the local courts would not
charge an actor for his participation in a crime against humanity, war crime, or
crime of genocide.25 2 Therefore, it is unlikely for an individual who is not
convicted by the ICC to be tried in his or her home country afterwards. If the
country has little incentive to turn over the individual in the first place, then it
would also have little incentive to cooperate with the ICC and produce the
acquiescence of powerful nations. Otherwise, international tribunals return to the setting of "victors'
justice, which begs the question whether international criminal law is capable ofequitable distribution.
Without salient enforcement, international criminal law provides only the enticing mirage of justice.
Id. at 364.
249. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 150, at art. 27 As of March 11, 2004, ten
nations have signed agreements with the United Nations to enforce sentences delivered by the ICTY
These include Italy, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, France, Spain, Denmark, Germany, and the
United Kingdom. Press Release, United Nations, The United Kingdom The 10th State to Sign an
Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences With the ICTY, (Mar. II, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/p830-e.htm.
250. The United States war with Iraq provides an example of where numerous attempts to kill the
leader of Iraq, Sadam Hussein, failed only to later find him and take him prisoner. The United States
has assured people that his trial will be "fair and transparent, however, it does not appear that an
impartial tribunal will sit in judgment of the former dictator. See Neil Lewis, Bush Leaves Unclear
Role ofIraqis in Any Trial, N.Y TiMES, Dec. 15, 2003, at A18.
251, See discussion in Part 1(3) of this paper.
252. Rome Statute, art. 5, sec. I.
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documents and required materials for a conviction.
CONCLUSION
The ICTY's attempts at steering clear of claims of "victor's justice" are
commendable, however, the reality of the Tribunal makes it impossible to enforce
its statute without having some nation, or group of nations, hand over the indicted
criminals. 253 States will only take the nsk of arresting international criminals if
they know they have the evidence to convict. Attempts at impaneling an impartial
jury will not overcome the intense pressure to convict. Without each nation ceding
jurisdiction to the ICC, it will be lost to the claims of victor's justice from those
nations who expect the most from the court's ability to prosecute wrong-doers,
those nations that are not strong enough to be the "victors.

253. See Penrose, supra note 233.

